Moskva, Moscow, Russian Federation
Our study focused on the role of two factors based on the well-known trust model: belief in loyalty (trust in society) and in abilities (trust in the individual). The empirical results confirm the hypothesis of the theoretical model, namely, partners will interact more effectively if their belief in loyalty and competence is high. The study also showed that the level of trust between partners is determined differently by the two factors considered: statistically proven, trust in society is more significant than trust in oneself. The article analyzes the influence of different trust dimensions on cooperation mechanisms.
moral hazard, trust, organizational cooperation, belief in loyalty, belief in ability
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