Presented article addresses the question from the point of civil servants’. Using a survey among Baltic civil servants, the authors assess their views on three types of anti-corruption instruments (awareness, punishment, extraordinary investigations rights) and question if the recommendation will change according to where they perceive corruption to be most critical. The article contains a short theoretical discussion about individual incentives to accept bribes linking these to policy recommendations. The authors conclude that reforms and ethical training are needed to promote professionalism and meritocracy among the civil servants as an important factor for curbing corruption. Conducted study shows that despite of the fact that penalties for civil servants are recognized as important tool for counteracting corruption, it should be strictly followed principle of legal state based on maintenance of rule of law emphasizing that tradeoffs with respect to civil rights are inacceptable.
противодействие коррупции, государственные гражданские служащие, профилактика коррупции, страны Балтии, антикоррупционное просвещение.
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