Federal states may encounter difficulties in applying international treaties on matters constitutionally committed to their constituent units. In such cases a federal state may not be able to join the treaty without some accommodation either by its constituent units or other parties to the treaty. There are certain methods by which these problems can be reduced: federal state clauses, territorial units clauses, and federalism reservations. Some treaties may include a federal state clause to the effect that limits the scope of treaty’s obligations to those that federal state’s government has constitutional authority to assume. Another solution is to include a territorial units clause where the treaty may apply to some of a state’s constituent units but not others. Several federal states have made reservations to limit their obligations to those areas of legislative jurisdiction that the federal government has assumed. On occasion, other states have objected to such reservations. Alternatively, a federal state may issue a federal declaration to explain how federalism affects its implementation of the treaty. Unitary states tend to resist the federal state clause and the territorial units clause because they create an imbalance between rights and obligations of the contracting federal and unitary states. Although such clauses are not popular with unitary states, they do make it that much easier for federations to become parties. Such clauses are a compromise between the interest of unitary and federal states. Domestic law provides no excuse for a failure to fully implement international treaty obligations. In international law, if the constituent units fail to comply, it is the federal government that is liable for the failure to properly implement the treaty.
federal state clause, territorial units clause, federalism reservation, federalism understanding, federal declaration, federal state, federal government, constituent units, unitary state, international treaty obligations.
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