MATHEMATICAL PROBLEMS OF DECISION-MAKING IN DYNAMIC ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS
Authors:
1.
Russian Federation
Type:
Monographie
ISBN:
978-5-16-017744-1
Status:
In work
Language:
Russian
Quantity of pages:
342
Publisher:
INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC.
Abstract (English):
The monograph develops the theory of decision-making in dynamic organizational systems with a complex structure in conditions of conflict and uncertainty. An overview of the current state of the theory is given. The systems are studied: hierarchical, coalition and coalition-hierarchical (hybrid). The main attention in the process of constructing mathematical models of systems is paid to the description of ways of information interaction of decision makers. At the same time, the variants of their unfavorable (conflict) and benevolent "attitude" to each other are taken into account. Two approaches to decision-making based on the principle of guaranteed results and approaches of game theory are proposed. Exactly: 1) making decisions from the point of view of a dedicated participant in the system based on penalty functions and obtaining the necessary optimality conditions; 2) making decisions based on special optimality principles constructed using the principles of Nash, Pareto, Joffrion, Stackelberg, Slater, threats — counter-threats and obtaining sufficient optimality conditions. Some theoretical results are illustrated by model examples. For researchers, postgraduates and students dealing with theoretical and practical issues of decision-making in complex systems.
The monograph develops the theory of decision-making in dynamic organizational systems with a complex structure in conditions of conflict and uncertainty. An overview of the current state of the theory is given. The systems are studied: hierarchical, coalition and coalition-hierarchical (hybrid). The main attention in the process of constructing mathematical models of systems is paid to the description of ways of information interaction of decision makers. At the same time, the variants of their unfavorable (conflict) and benevolent "attitude" to each other are taken into account. Two approaches to decision-making based on the principle of guaranteed results and approaches of game theory are proposed. Exactly: 1) making decisions from the point of view of a dedicated participant in the system based on penalty functions and obtaining the necessary optimality conditions; 2) making decisions based on special optimality principles constructed using the principles of Nash, Pareto, Joffrion, Stackelberg, Slater, threats — counter-threats and obtaining sufficient optimality conditions. Some theoretical results are illustrated by model examples. For researchers, postgraduates and students dealing with theoretical and practical issues of decision-making in complex systems.
