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 <front>
  <journal-meta>
   <journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">Humanities. Bulletin of the University of Finance</journal-id>
   <journal-title-group>
    <journal-title xml:lang="en">Humanities. Bulletin of the University of Finance</journal-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="ru">
     <trans-title>Гуманитарные науки. Вестник Финансового университета</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </journal-title-group>
   <issn publication-format="print">2226-7867</issn>
  </journal-meta>
  <article-meta>
   <article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">10215</article-id>
   <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.12737/17059</article-id>
   <article-categories>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="ru">
     <subject>Гуманитарная теория в интеллектуальном поиске</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group subj-group-type="toc-heading" xml:lang="en">
     <subject>Humanitarian Theory in Intelligent Search</subject>
    </subj-group>
    <subj-group>
     <subject>Гуманитарная теория в интеллектуальном поиске</subject>
    </subj-group>
   </article-categories>
   <title-group>
    <article-title xml:lang="en">Theory of Political Business Cycles, and Manipulation Monetary Policy</article-title>
    <trans-title-group xml:lang="ru">
     <trans-title>Теория политических деловых циклов и манипуляционная монетарная политика</trans-title>
    </trans-title-group>
   </title-group>
   <contrib-group content-type="authors">
    <contrib contrib-type="author">
     <name-alternatives>
      <name xml:lang="ru">
       <surname>Ильинский</surname>
       <given-names>Александр Иоильевич</given-names>
      </name>
      <name xml:lang="en">
       <surname>Ilinskiy</surname>
       <given-names>Aleksandr Иоильевич</given-names>
      </name>
     </name-alternatives>
     <email>ailyinsky@fa.ru</email>
    </contrib>
   </contrib-group>
   <pub-date publication-format="print" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2015-12-11T00:00:00+03:00">
    <day>11</day>
    <month>12</month>
    <year>2015</year>
   </pub-date>
   <pub-date publication-format="electronic" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2015-12-11T00:00:00+03:00">
    <day>11</day>
    <month>12</month>
    <year>2015</year>
   </pub-date>
   <volume>5</volume>
   <issue>4</issue>
   <fpage>53</fpage>
   <lpage>60</lpage>
   <self-uri xlink:href="https://naukaru.ru/en/nauka/article/10215/view">https://naukaru.ru/en/nauka/article/10215/view</self-uri>
   <abstract xml:lang="ru">
    <p>Теория политических деловых циклов рассматривает возможности манипулирования макроэкономическими переменными — выпуском внутреннего валового продукта, уровнем безработицы и инфляцией с целью получения политических преимущества в процессе будущих выборов в демократическом обществе. Периодичность выборов приводит к циклическим&#13;
движениям в национальной экономике. Воздействия на экономику осуществляются через монетарную политику, проводимую центральным банком. Центральный банк в своих оперативных действиях является независимым от правительства.&#13;
Однако де-факто руководство центрального банка имеет множество связей с правительством, что открывает последнему&#13;
скрытые от избирателя каналы манипулирования монетарной политикой в своих политических интересах.&#13;
Активное манипулирование американской экономикой в политических целях президентом Ричардом Никсоном в 1972 г.&#13;
привлекло внимание Уильяма Нордхауза и послужило основанием для создания им теории политических деловых циклов.&#13;
Настоящая работа посвящена анализу мотивов исследования У. Нордхауза 1975 г. в контексте американской политической и макроэкономической ситуации во времена президентства Р. Никсона. Рассматриваются данные о манипулировании монетарной политикой, проводимой Федеральной резервной системой США во времена выборов 1972 г. и их&#13;
макроэкономические последствия. Отдельно анализируются личные и профессиональные отношения Артура Бернса и&#13;
Ричарда Никсона.</p>
   </abstract>
   <trans-abstract xml:lang="en">
    <p>The theory of political business cycles is focused on the possibility for manipulating of the macroeconomic variables — gross&#13;
domestic product output, unemployment level, and inflation in order to obtain political advantages in the process of future elections&#13;
in a democratic society. The periodicity of elections results in cyclical movements at the national economy. The impacts on the&#13;
economy are carried out through the monetary policy pursued by the Central Bank. The Central Bank is independent from the&#13;
government in its operational activities. However, de-facto the Central Bank’s top management has a lot of connections with the&#13;
government, paving the later with hidden from voter channels for monetary policy manipulating in the government’s political interests.&#13;
The active manipulation of the American economy by the president Richard Nixon in 1972 in his own political goals had drawn&#13;
William Nordhaus attention and had formed the basis for creation by him the theory of political business cycles. The present paper devoted to analysis of the Nordhaus research (1975) motives in the context of American political and&#13;
macroeconomic situation during the Richard Nixon’s presidency. Data on the monetary policy manipulation pursued by the US&#13;
Federal Reserve System during the elections of 1972 and their macroeconomic consequences are considered. The personal and&#13;
professional relationship of Arthur F. Burns and Richard Nixon are analyzed separately.</p>
   </trans-abstract>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="ru">
    <kwd>Теория политических деловых циклов</kwd>
    <kwd>монетарная политика</kwd>
    <kwd>манипулирование американской экономикой</kwd>
    <kwd>Федеральная резервная системой США</kwd>
    <kwd>президентские выборы 1972 г.</kwd>
    <kwd>агрегированная функция голосования</kwd>
    <kwd>обратное политическое дисконтирование</kwd>
    <kwd>модели демократических выборов.</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
   <kwd-group xml:lang="en">
    <kwd>political business cycle theory</kwd>
    <kwd>monetary policy</kwd>
    <kwd>manipulation of American economy</kwd>
    <kwd>US Federal Reserve System</kwd>
    <kwd>presidential election of 1972</kwd>
    <kwd>aggregate voting function</kwd>
    <kwd>reverse political discounting</kwd>
    <kwd>democratic elections models.</kwd>
   </kwd-group>
  </article-meta>
 </front>
 <body>
  <p></p>
 </body>
 <back>
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</article>
